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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL
THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF MAYOR LEWIS CUTRER
OF HOUSTON, 1958-1960
by Leah Brooke Tucker
39
More than a decade has passed since Lewis Cutrer, a transplanted Mississippi
lawyer, was elected mayor of Houston in 1957. The city. then with a population of
about 800,000 people, was one of the fastest growing cities in the nation, and this
challenged Cutrer with a number of new or unsolved problems. l
It was Lewis Cutrer's earliest associations in the city's legal circles that led to
his interest in politics. After about two years of practicing law in two different firms,
he became an assistant city attorney when Walter E. Monteith was mayor of Houston
from 1929 until 1933. 2
Monteith was the political rival of Mayor Oscar Holcombe, the perennial mayor
of Houston for a period of eleven non-consecutive terms. It was natural for Cutrer
to join with the political friends of Monteith in opposition to the Holcombe camp,
for, after all, it was Monteith who had appointed him as an assistant city attorney.
Later, when Holcombe defeated Monteith for a term beginning in 1934, Cutrer left
his job as assistant city attorney and joined with the ousted Monteith to organize a
new law firm. 3 They practiced together until Monteith was elected justice of the First
Court of Civil Appeals in 1939, and then Cutrer formed his own firm. 4
Apparently Cutrer was a sympathizer and supporter of the "outs" during the Hal·
combe administrations and became an open opponent of Holcombe. For no sooner
had Holcombe been defeated and a new man taken over the mayor's duties, than Cutrer
won political appointment to a new and better job at City Hall. He was city attorney
from 1941 until 1947, having first been appointed by Mayor C. A. (Neal) Pickett and
reappointed by Mayor Otis Massey. In 1947, Cutrer was out again because Holcombe
came back to the mayor's desk. Obviously, Cutrer was a perennial out during the
Holcombe administrations. Cutrer supported Mayor Roy Hofheinz in his election cam·
paigns in 1952 and 1954.~ When a scandal ripped Holcombe's administration late in
1957, Cutrer decided this was the year to try his luck as a candidate for mayor of
Houston.
The very nature of the campaign cast Cutrer more or less in the role of a "reform
mayor." The Holcombe administration presented a tarnished image. One of the eight
councilmen had been accused of making a $100,000 profit in the purchase of some
bonds issued by a water district.6 Cutrer seized on this as he campaigned against Mayor
Holcombe in 1957. Both Cutrer and Mayor Holcombe fought out their first campaign
along personal lines. No evidence of partisan politics could be found. There were no
Republican or Democratic primaries, only a city election and then the run-off between
Holcombe and Cutrer. Cutrer came in first in the general election.
In the 1957 mayor's race, Cutrer was supported by former Mayor Hofheinz and
many liberals. In fact, when Cutrer appeared as a candidate for mayof in 1957, most
Houstonians believed that the liberal forces were "pushing another Hofheinz. "7 This
was natural to believe since Cutrer's previous government activities branded him as
an opponent of Holcombe and therefore a liberal. H Cutrer was allied with the liberal
faction by virtue of his alignment with Mayor Walter E. Monteith's administration,
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when he served as assistant city attorney. Cutrer had also served as city attorney for
liberal oriented Mayor Neal Pickett in 1941 and 1942, and as city attorney during the
city manager period from 1943 to 1946,9 During 1955 and 1956, Cutrer had served
as general attorney for the liberal-controlled Houston Independent School District, and
later he served as Mayor Roy Hofheinz's personal attorney.10
Many of Cutrer's opponents hoped that his associations with Hofheinz would help
defeat him. It was precisely because Cutrer appeared to be a liberal, that the conserva-
tives tried to secure a candidate to oppose him. II It was for this reason that the conserva-
tives asked Oscar Holcombe to run again. Holcombe agreed to run, and decided to
make crystal clear his stance by calling himself a "conservative" in the campaign. 12
As an index to Holcombe's support, it was noted that all three Houston newspapers
and almost all of the business leaders of Houston favored Holcombe,l3
The Holcombe-Cutrer campaign was probably as near to a conservative-liberal
battle as is possible in Houston City campaigns. 14 However, the Democratic leaders
of the city did not actively participate in that they did not officially endorse candidates,
and did not use party funds to back city candidates. The Democrats, on a personal
level, did, however, support individual candidates. 15 The conservative-liberal aspect
of the 1957 campaign actually took its label more from the former associations of can-
didates than from specifically stated proposals and platforms. 16
Public reaction to racism appears to have played an important part in the election.
In the first election Cutrer received nearly 10,000 more votes than HolcombeY Yet
the other two candidates polled enough votes to keep Cutrer from winning a majority.
Cutrer had strong support from the Negro voters, and allegedly Holcombe tried to
use Cutrer's considerable Negro support to defeat Cutrer in the run-off election.l~
However, when voting time came, Cutrer succeeded in carrying every black precinct
in Houston by a surprising combined margin of 22 to 1, In addition, Cutrer carried
a majority in each of the "labor boxes. " Lewis Cutrer apparently caught the imagination
of the voters because the December 3 vote showed 67,600 to Holcombe's 39,156,19
On January 2, 1958, Lewis W. Cutrer was sworn into office as mayor of a city
of 800,000 people and covering 349 square miles. 'to The burgeoning city of Houston
presented the new mayor with many problems.
One of Cutrer's first acts in office was to call together the City Council to discuss
adoption of a two-year public improvement program to be supported by $35 million
in bonds. He asked the voters to approve this program during his first month in office.
and on January 24, 1958. the bond issue was overwhelmingly passed.~1 With his public
improvement program financed and underway, Mayor Cutrer set about other tasks,
mainly those of solving the water problem, buying a second airport site, building a
new charity hospital, and studying the needs of the inadequate bus system.
Cutrer felt that the major accomplishment during his first two~year term was bring-
ing together the various warring factions and getting them to accept a plan to solve
Houston's industrial water problems.
In 1958, Houston was one of the nation's major cities without an adequate industrial
water supply. This had become a nation-wide problem as industrialization increased.
Houston's growing industrial complex along the Ship Channel was demanding large
quantities of water which the underground supply could not satisfy. 22 Under Holcombe's "-'
administration, engineers recommended that the Trinity River be the source of needed .,..
water and that a reservoir, Lake Livingston, be constructed at a place seven miles
southwest of the city of Livingston,23
The Trinity River Authority was empowered by the state of Texas to develop
the Trinity. Therefore, the city of Houston could not build the reservoir without the
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permission and co-operation of the TRA. The TRA was a Dallas oriented agency and
was charged with being generally disinterested in helping Houston solve its water
problem, although it had co-operated fully with Dallas and Fort Worth in developing
water sources for those cities. 24
In late August of 1958, Ben Carpenter, president of the Trinity River Authority,
lead a delegation of TRA representatives to Austin for the purpose of a joint hearing
with city of Houston officials before the State Board of Water Engineers. The problem
to be discussed was whether Houston, which lies outside the Trinity Watershed, or
the TRA. was to build two projects on the lower reaches of the Trinity_ These two
projects were to be a dam and a reservoir at Livingston and a salt water barrier at
Wallisville in Chambers County. Houston, which wanted to build a reservoir capable
of yielding 1.2 billion gallons of water daily, applied for a permit to build. However,
the TRA had filed earlier for permission to build such a dam. 25 Carpenter at first said
that the granting of Houston's request for reservoirs at Wallisville and Livingston would
wreck the Master Plan for the development of the Trinity. 26
In February, 1958, Carpenter made a special proposal to supply Houston with
550 million gallons of water daily from the Trinity_ At the time, Mayor Cutrer refused
the offer, saying the price was too highY
Officers of the TRA claimed that the Texas Legislature charged the Authority
with the sale responsibility for building reservoirs along the Trinity River. Carpenter,
president of the TRA, declared that the act which created the TRA placed the responsi-
bility of building the salt water barrier upon the Authority. 28 In a heated verbal battle,
Mayor Cutrer accused the Mayor of Dallas and TRA president Carpenter of making
statements that were not true and not based upon fact. Cutter asserted that there was
enough water in the Trinity for all the cities and counties in the watershed and for
the additional seven counties which asked for permission to use Trinity Water. 29 Mayor
Cutrer announced that he was forming a citizen's committee and that he intended to
make personal visits to every point in the seven county area in order to present accu-
rately Houston's plan of development. 30
In January of 1959, the TRA mapped out a careful campaign to scuttle Houston's
rival plans on the Trinity. They voted (1) to build a reservoir at Livingston and a
salt water barrier at Wallisville as soon as possible, (2) to circulate petitions throughout
the watershed counties protesting Houston's application to build, and (3) to employ
a lawyer from the Trinity area to work in the watershed area in an effort to counteract
what Houstonians were saying about this case. 31
August 31 was set as the day for the beginning of the combined hearings of Hous-
ton's and the Trinity River Authority's application for dams on the lower Trinity
River. 32 TRA president Carpenter and Mayor Cutrer met secretly in Austin two weeks
prior to the scheduled August 31 hearing in an effort to air their disagreements and
to consider once again the others' proposals.33
On August 26, 1959, Cutrer announced that the State Board of Water Engineers
had postponed until September 15 the proposed hearing on Houston's Trinity water
plan. The hearing was postponed in order to give Houston more time to seek a comprom-
ise agreement with the T RA. 34
A permanent agreement between the Trinity River Authority and Houston was
finally reached on September 9, 1959. This compromise Trinity River Plan marked
the end of a near two-year battle between the city of Houston and the Trinity River
Authority.3:> There were three main provisions to the agreement: (I) Houston was to
receive approximately 70 percent of the daily yield of 1.2 billion gallons, while the
TRA was to receive the other 30 percent; (2) Houston and the TRA were to build,
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operate, and maintain the project by sharing the costs on a 70-30 ratio; and (3) reservoirs
were to be owned equally by the Trinity River Authority and Houston. 36
To summarize the role of the mayor in this project. we have seen that in order
to bring together the various hostile factions into a workable program to solve Houston's
industrial water shortage, Cutrer had organized a campaign which took him up and
down the river, speaking to political groups, county officials, state representatives,
senators, and the public, urging co-operation in getting the reservoir built. He urged
the people in the nine southermost counties to pressure the TRA into relenting and
signing a contract with the city of Houston for the construction of the lake. This was
an excellent and unusual public relations job, in that Cutrer won the respect and co-
operation of the leading citizens in the counties and cities along the Trinity River as
well as members of the TRA board itself. The final outcome was, of Course, that Cutrer
and the TRA hammered out a contract for the construction of the darn. 37
The signing of the agreement On September 9, 1959 between the city of Houston
and the TRA meant that a supply of water estimated to permit expansion up to the
year 2010 was in sight. 3s This in itself was enough to encourage large industries in
other sections of the nation to come to Houston and to expand plants they already
had in the Harris-Chambers county industrial area.
Another of Cutrer's chief accomplishments during his first administration was the
purchase of a site for the Houston Inter-continental Airport, eighteen miles north of
the city. It had become obvious that the existing airport was inadequate for the future
needs of the growing metropolis.
During his first two·year term, Cutrer's administration completed the purchase
of a site for the new airport from the Jetero Ranch Company. The Jetero Ranch Com-
pany was composed of a group of twenty civic leaders and oilmen who had fonned
a syndicate for the specific purpose of purchasing the 3,125 acre siteS9 which had been
earlier blocked up and set aside by their agent, Archer Romero. 4o
In October, 1957, before Cutrer was to take office as mayor of Houston the follow-
ing January, Holcombe made arrangements for the purchase of the site ..fl On November
6, 1957, the City Council unanimously approved an ordinance authorizing the mayor
to execute a contract with the Jetero Ranch Company for the purpose of buying the
land. 42 According to the terms of the agreement, the city of Houston was to pay
$1,860,938.27 to the Jetero Ranch Company for the 3,125 acres of land over a three
year period..f3 The first payment was due on February I, 1958. The entire purchase
was to be completed by February 1, 1960. u It was obvious that the actual purchase
of the tract would be a decision for the future city administration (Cutter's) to make,
since the principal payment would not be made until the end of the three year period. 4 !>
The city of Houston defaulted in its first interest payment to the Jetero Ranch
Company, due February I, 1958. 46 According to the terms of the Jetero contract, if
Houston defaulted on any payments, the land was to revert automatically to the Jetero
Ranch Company. However, Jetero notified Cutter that they would gladly ex:tend the
deadline. Fortunately for the city of Houston, this extension prevented the loss of
the option for the second airport siteY The city of Houston moved nearer realization
of a new jet airport when the City Council, on March 26, 1958, voted to pick up the
option on the second airport site. 48 ....,
In April, 1958, Colonel E. A. Hansen, district engineer at Galveston, brought it~
to the attention of Clinton Owsley that a 1954 offer of 4,160 acres of land made by
the United States Army Engineers for an airport site for Houston still stood. The site,
which was located inside the Addicks Dam Reservoir, could be acquired by the city
without cost. 49
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On September 9. 1958. the City Council fonnally rejected the Addicks Reservoir
as the site for the city's new jet airport. A report made by Airport Engineer Clarence
Lieb revealed that it would cost the city approximately $1,500 per acre to build up
the land's elevation to the 110 feet required. In addition, the city would have to purchase
more land outside the reservoir. This would mean that the Addicks site would really
cost the city more than the Jetero site.50
It was not until June 27. 1960, that the Houston City Council authorized Mayor
Cutrer to finally close the deal with Jetero,51 The owners of the 3,125 acre site were
subsequently paid the $1,860,938.27 as principal payment plus considerable accrued
interest and miscellaneous fees. 5z
Cutrer had successfully launched the project of acquiring a jet-age airport for
Houston. He had worked hard and diligently in laying the groundwork for aviation
changes and improvements which were to be realized later. What Cutrer actually accom-
plished in the aviation area was (I) to buy the site, (2) to win new and improved air
routes for Houston from the CAB, and (3) to hire professional planners to start mapping
out the new facility.
In April of 1958, Ben Taub, chairman of the Jefferson Davis Hospital Board,
announced that the overcrowded hospital, where seventeen babies had died recently
as a result of staphylococcus epidemic, S3 had been alerted by the American Hospital
Association that it would lose its national accreditation if construction of a new charity
hospital was not started by May 4, 1959.54 What actually happened was that in May
of 1958, ajoint commission of the American College of Physicians, American College
of Surgeons, American Hospital Association, and the American Medical Association
withdrew the accreditation of Jefferson Davis Hospit~l.n
After the initial threat and subsequent loss of accreditation, it was obvious that
the building ofa new charity hospital was ofthe utmost urgency. 58 There were, however,
two major obstacles which greatly delayed the building of the hospital. These were
the problems of financing the hospital as a joint city~council project and the problem
of where the hospital was to be located. The question concerning finances was whether
or not the city and the county would share the hospital costs on a 70-30 percent ratio
as earlier planned, and whether or not the federal government would grant part or
all of the needed $1.5 million from the Hill-Burton Act funds. 57
The problem involving the location of the hospital centered around the fact that
Mayor Cutrer, the Houston City Council, and Baylor University College of Medicine
wanted to build the hospital at the Texas Medical Society, plus many interested private
citizens of Houston wanted the new charity hospital to be built at the present Jefferson
Davis Hospital site on Buffalo Bayou.S8
The argument given for the construction of the hospital at the Texas Medical Center
was that it was more centrally located, would be more easily accessible to charity
patients, and would provide excellent medical facilities since it would be located in
the Medical Center.
Those who wanted to build the new hospital at the old Jefferson Davis Hospital
site said that this location was more accessible to the indigent sick of the city since
it was located near an artery of intersecting highways and on a freeway. They also
claimed that it would be much less expensive to have the new hospital at the Jefferson
Davis site because the taxpayers would then be supporting only one large charity hospi-
tal at one location, instead of two hospitals at two different locations.
In April of 1958, the Harris County Medical Society's executive board rejected
the proposal of County Judge Bob Casey when he asserted that the new city-county
charity hospital should be built in the Texas Medical Center. S9
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Baylor Medical School, which then staffed the Jefferson Davis Hospital as part
of its teaching program, made it quite clear that it wished to continue that arrangement \.r
with the proposed new charity hospital. However, the Harris County Medical Society
wanted the staffing of the hospital split three ways between the Medical Society, Baylor
College of Medicine, and the University of Texas Postgraduate School of Medicine. 60
On April 28, city and county officials approved the immediate construction of a
new 350-bed charity hospital in the Texas Medical Center. 51 This surprise ending to
the fight over the Medical Center site, which was opposed by the executive board
of the Harris County Medical Society, came by majority vote of both the City Council
and the Commissioners Court. 6: Both the council and the court approved the following:
(1) construction of new outpatient and emergency facilities at Jefferson Davis Hospital;
(2) shelved the question of how to finance the new hospital 'operation until some
indefinitie time in the future; (3) refused to take any action on proposals to share profes.
sional staffin~ of Jefferson Davis Hospital. 63
In May of 1958, city and county officials finally ironed out their differences concern-
ing the plans for the financing of the new charity hospital. The City Council ended
its disagreement and voted 7-2 to accept the County Commissioners' demand that the
city continue to pay 70 percent of the operating cost of the two charity hospitals until
the time that the county could take over the entire burden. 64
[n order to help finance the hospital, Mayor Cutrer applied for federal Hill-Burton
Act funds. By June, 1958, it was still doubtful as to whether Houston would receive
any federal aid at all. One reason for this was that the city of Houston had still not
reached a final decision on where the hospital was to be located. 6:-
The Harris County Medical Society, still not content with the proposed hospital
site in the Medical Center, sought to force a city-wide vote on the location on the
new hospita1.66 The Medical Society's referendum proposal was submitted to the voters
at the July 26 primaries. The vote on the city ordinance requiring the new charity
hospital to be built at the Jefferson Davis Hospital site was voted down by a count
of 41,949 to 38,838. This meant that the new hospital was to be built in the Texas
Medical Center near the Baylor University College of Medicine. 67
On September 9. 1958, Houston did receive the $1.5 million grant in federal HiIl-
Burton Act funds. This grant assured the city and county of enough money to rehabilitate
Jefferson Davis Hospital and to build the new charity hospital. 66 On December 1,
the Commissioners' Court approved preliminary plans for the $12 million hospital pro-
ject.69
Public transportation is a problem that plagues practically every major American
city. Probably none has found the complete solution; certainly Houston has not.
However, Mayor Lewis Cutrer did assume the task of studying the needs and
deficiencies of the Houston Transit Company. He wrestled intelligently and effectively
with the various problems of the system. realizing that something had to be done to
improve bus service in Houston.
There were at least four problems concerning the bus system with which Mayor
Cutrer had to deal. First, there was a great need to improve and especially to air-
condition the city buses. Second, the Houston Transit Company was in dire financial
straits with the company being verbally up for sale. Third, the bus company vehemently '-f
challenged their tax evaluation and assessment. Last, the Transport Workers Union......
demanded a wage increase which involved a fare hike. A bus strike was scheduled
for November 3, 1959 if a solution to the financial problems had not been reached.
Tn 1958, when Cutrer took office as mayor of Houston, the Houston Transit Com-
pany was operating old, yellow buses; none were air-conditioned, and some were as
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old as eighteen years. 7 (1 Although Cutrer realized that a fare increase would probably
be involved in the air-conditioning of city buses. he was still interested in the project
because, among other things, he was greatly concerned about "keeping up" with the
progress of Dallas, and other Southern cities. 71 In January of 1959, Mayor Cutrer
remarked that if the HOllston Transit Company failed to air~condition at least some
of its buses before summer, it would surely set a new record as "the most backward
transit company" and would be the "laughing stock of the South. "72
It was in May of 1957, that the Houston Transit Company first flew distress signals
when its gross revenue dropped 11.3 percent over a period of twenty-three months. 73
From all outward indications, it appeared that the bus company was going out of
business. Just two months prior to leaving office, Mayor Holcombe quietly ordered
the Houston Transit Company's 1957 tax bill reduced by more than 50 percent. 74 This,
of course, averted an impending bus strike. However, in June of 1958. Mayor Cutrer
ordered that the Houston Transit Company's taxes were to be restored to the full
assessed valuation of the firm's personal property. 75 The bus company vehemently
challenged this tax assessment by appealing its 1958 tax bill to the City Council, claiming
illegal and improper assessment of its personal property and franchise. 76
In December of 1958, Cutrer suggested an assessment cut of approximately $1.8
million from the Houston Transit Company's original assessment. He did not, however,
try very hard to push through his measure and the City Council failed to take any
action on the proposal at that session. 77 However, on December 30. 1958. the Houston
Transit Company quickly accepted the City Council's otTer to settle its 1958 tax bill
for $91.378.47 instead of $163,730. 7H In revising the figures upon which the 1958 taxes
were based, Mayor Cutrer placed an arbitrary value of $25,000 on the controversial
bus franchise. Cutrer vindicated this action on the grounds that some of the buses
were almost twenty years old, and that the average life of a bus was eleven years.
Probably, with tongue in cheek. he said a consideration of the historical value rather
than the market value was used in reaching the decision. 79
The contract of some 850 members of the Transport Workers of America Local
260 with the Houston Transit Company was due to expire on November 3. only eighteen
days prior to the November 21 city elections. Bo If no agreement was reached by this
time, then Cutrer would have to be untangling bus problems at the same time that
he was running for re-election. This, of course, could be politically disastrous.
The principal demands asked by the union were a 16-cent hourly wage hike for
the first year and a to-cent hourly wage hike after a year, plus fringe benefits. The
drivers were trying to push their hourly wage scale above the existing $2,04 rate. HI
On October 21, the Houston bus drivers voted unanimously to strike at one minute
after midnight on November 3 unless "a decent settlement" with the bus company
had been reached. B2 By November 3, 19S9, the drivers for the Houston Transit Company
went on strike. 83
Almost immediately, the striking bus drivers voted to end the four-hour-old bus
strike. They agreed to return to work under a IS-day contract extension which was
proposed by Cutrer. The offer. which was an 8-cent hourly increase for the first year
and a 6-cent the second, was contingent upon the City Council's approval ofa company
A reque,ted bu, rare increa,e."
'" On November 15, just before the two-week "cooling off" period was to expire,
Mayor Cutrer presented a new proposal which he hoped would avert a city bus driver's
strike. This proposal was for an immediate l-cent fare hike, and the releasing of the
company of any obligation to finance air-conditioned buses at the present time. 6~ The
next day, a new two-year contract was signed. granting the Houston Transit Company
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drivers a wage increase. and ending threats of a bus strike. In the agreement the City
Council granted the company a I-cent fare raise. sufficient to cover the wage increase.
The adult fare was raised from 22 to 23 cents and the token fare was raised from
20 to 21 cents. ss
On December 14, 1959, the City Council, acting upon recommendation from Mayor
Cutrer, voted unanimously to reduce the Houston Transit Company's 1959 taxes from
$96,737 to $78,937,87 Problems relating to service and air-conditioning remained.
Nevertheless, the company's management and their employees seemed willing to con-
tinue operations and the city had avoided the expenses and complaints which would
attend any attempt of city ownership and operation.
The newspapers and many conservatives had felt in 1957 that Cutrer had been
the creation of liberals. However, once in office, Cutrer quickly succeeded in reconciling
himself with many of the conservatives who had opposed his election in 1957. Con-
sequently, by election time in November of 1959, no outstanding business leader and
not one Houston newspaper opposed Cutrer's re-election. S8 This was a sizable
accomplishment, considering than just two years before, every newspaper in Houston
had opposed Cutrer and nearly all of the top business leaders in the city were against
him. BlI
It is difficult to ascertain just how Mayor Cutrer became so quickly acceptable
to the conservatives. Liberals said that one reason for this success was that Cutrer
made it his policy never to cross business interests. 9o The liberals accused Cutrer of
defecting from their camp in favor of middle-of-the-road support. 9J
In 1957 Cutrer was elected mayor with strong liberal support. By the end of Cutrer's
first year in office a very definite voter realignment had taken place, and by election
time in November of 1959, the support for Cutrer, both liberal and conservative, was
balanced. IIi
Although Cutrer did not bring to ultimate completion any of his major projects
during these first two years in office, he did wrestle intelligently and effectively with
the problems of securing needed revenue by pushing through the bond issue, obtaining
assurance of acquiring badly needed industrial waters from the TRA, expanding the
airport, solving the controversy over the new charity hospital, and improving the highly
inadequate bus system of Houston. Also, Cutrer set up and successfully launched a
far-reaching and quite varied program for public welfare and, at the same time, won
popular support from the citizens of Houston. The political appraisal of Cutrer's
administration. regardless of personal conflicts, evidenced much success and accom-
plishment for the city of Houston during his first two years as mayor. The citizens
of Harris County, being cognizant of Cutrer's many contributions to the civic welfare,
re-elected him mayor of Houston in 1959.
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